The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution by Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard & Pech, Gerald
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard; Pech, Gerald
Working Paper
The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability
of the Fiscal Constitution
CSLE Discussion Paper, No. 2003-01
Provided in cooperation with:
Universität des Saarlandes (UdS)
Suggested citation: Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard; Pech, Gerald (2003) : The Role of Beliefs





The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the  
Fiscal Constitution 
 
K. J. Bernhard Neumärker















†  Saarland  University,  Department  of  Economics,   Economic  Theory,   Bld.  31,  Room  304,  
D - 66123  Saarbrücken  and  Ruhr-University  Bochum,  Department of Economics,  GC 2/62,  
D-44780 Bochum, Email: bernhard.k.neumaerker@ruhr-uni-bochum.de 
 
‡  May Wong-Smith Fellow, CRIEFF, St Salvator's College, University of St Andrews, St 








February 19, 2003 The role of beliefs for the sustainability of the ﬁscal
constitution∗
K.J. Bernhard Neumärker and Gerald Pech†
February 19, 2003
ABSTRACT
Why does the government not defect from the constitution? This article
focuses on the dynamic restraints the government faces under the rule of law:
violations against unconstitutional laws are not punished under the constitution.
If a violating government cannot commit itself never to reinstall the constitu-
tion enforcing an unconstitutional law becomes diﬃcult. Citizens’ expectations
to go unpunished when not complying may be self-fulﬁlling. Deriving the equi-
librium of a global game we show that this mechanism is eﬀectively deterring a
government from defecting from a constitutionally permissible tax rate.
JEL codes: K42, H26, E61, D7 Keywords: tax evasion, global games, self-
fulﬁlling expectations, dynamic policy restraints
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1I. Introduction
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it
(American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 16, Section 177).
Some constitutional frameworks explicitly or implicitly set a maximum rate at which the
government can impose a tax. Such a constitutional restraint was introduced by proposition
13 in California in 1978. The amendment placed a limit of 1% of the 1875 market value to the
amount of property taxes chargeable (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental relations,
Intergovernmental Perspective 5 No. 1, 1979). Eight other states followed this ﬁscal reform
step. In Germany the constitutional court has lately interpreted the constitution as saying
that the government must not claim more than half of the income of its citizens.
The wider question of why the government actually obeys such a restriction has, to our
knowledge, never been answered in the literature. Clearly, there are counter checks and
balances in the constitutional framework. But pointing to these devices does not answer the
question of why the government should accept the mechanisms imposed by the constitution
at all when it has the power to execute a policy at will.
Apart from the question of why constitutional restraints are not violated there is another,
closely related observation: Governments rarely dare to openly violate the formal proceedings
required by the constitution. In fact, even in ﬂagrant cases of transgression, the government
involved is usually trying to at least formally stay within the constitutional order. Recent
examples include the dealings of President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Musharraf of
Pakistan. Even the disempowerment of parliament in the German Third Reich was approved
by a decision taken in parliament itself.
2This suggests that there must be a special provision of the formal constitutional order
that has a larger impact than material substance. In an attempt to ﬁnd such a provision this
article explores the consequences of one integral part of any constitutional order: the rule of
law. Under the rule of law, breaking an unconstitutional law is with impunity. As long as
there is any real chance that the unconstitutional government is succeeded by a constitutional
one, this prospect discourages the obedience of the unconstitutional law. Economically, resis-
tance against unconstitutional laws must increase the cost of enforcing the unconstitutional
law. More than this: Once the enforcement of the unconstitutional law becomes suﬃciently
costly, the government has an incentive to return to the constitutional state in order to
lower its cost, thereby making the expectations of impunity self-fulﬁlling. From this angle,
it makes totally sense that governments strive to give their actions constitutional durability.
This paper builds the bridge between costly detection eﬀorts and relief from prosecution
in the ﬁeld of taxation and tax evasion. This is the area of law which has probably been
most thoroughly explored in terms of formal analysis. The idea is that no government is
able to enforce its tax laws if everybody evades taxes and that everybody evades taxes if the
government is predicted not to enforce the law.
For our formal analysis we assume that the government can eﬀectively choose between
a constitutional state in which an announced punishment is actually carried out and an
unconstitutional state in which the punishment is only carried out when the government stays
in the unconstitutional state. Consider the position of a government which has just violated
the constitution, i.e. which has announced a tax rate which is too high. Citizens declare
taxes and the government observes aggregate tax evasion and learns about its strength or its
3preference for the unconstitutional state. If strength is low and enforcement is suﬃciently
costly, the government decides that it is better oﬀ under the constitution. Under common
knowledge there are multiple equilibria for a range of preference parameter: If a suﬃcient
share of citizens believe that the government returns to the constitution, this expectation
is self-fulﬁlling. But there is another equilibrium where the government stays outside of
the constitution and this is expected by the citizens. Our way to derive a unique critical
value for the preference parameter is standard now in economics: We analyse a global game
where citizens receive only a noisy signal of the government’s strength and have to conclude
whether suﬃciently many citizens have received a signal which induces them to speculate on
the government giving up its policy. From the possibility of a switch back a dynamic policy
restraint results. This causes the government to be more reluctant to violate the constitution
in the ﬁrst place, so the rule of law is an endogenous enforcement mechanism. We extend
our results to a stationary inﬁnite horizon framework. While we get strong results on the
eﬀectiveness of the rule of law we ﬁn dt h a ti nt h ec a s eo ft a xl a w st h e r ei ss o m ea m b i g u i t y
because the constitution usually not only guarantees freedom from punishment of violating
an unconstitutional law - thereby encouraging tax evasion in the unconstitutional state - but
also relief of unjustiﬁed taxes - thereby encouraging tax payment. Our results hold, however,
if the cost of detection suﬃciently increases with tax evasion.
Our model diﬀers from alternative models of collective action which rely on herding
behavior (Banerjee, 1992) or on signalling by other agents (Lohmann, 1993) which are inap-
propriate in a tax evasion framework. It also diﬀers from dynamic approaches to the social
contract like that of Kotlikoﬀ/Persson/Svennson (1988) where the dynamic constraint is,
4eﬀectively, based on a rules-versus discretion argument.
Our paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we lay out the structure of the game.
In section 3 we set up the decision problems of the citizens and the government. Section
4 establishes multiplicity of equilibria, i.e. switching back and not switching back after a
violation in the case of common knowledge. In section 5 we reconsider the decision to switch
back in the case of imperfect information. Section 6 applies results from the theory of global
games to our heterogeneous agent framework. Section 7 sets up the government’s decision
problem whether or not to violate the constitution in the ﬁrst place and extends the model
to an inﬁnite horizon.
II. Overview of the Game Structure
Figure 1 depicts the basic game between subsequent governments and the citizens. Node c
signiﬁes a constitutional and node nc a unconstitutional state. In each node the government
and the private sector take a decision. Decision variables of the government appear in brace-
brackets with the information set indicated after the dash. The decision variables and the
information set of the private sector are written in square brackets. If the decision has an
eﬀect on the game path, we indicate in round brackets next to an edge the values of the
decision variables which are in accordance with this path.
At stage 0 in period t, the government is in the constitutional state and observes a state
variable kt−1 which is the current realization of a preference indicator k.A p o s i t i v e v a l u e
expresses a preference of the government for the unconstitutional state and a negative value
indicates a preference for the constitutional state. This preference might be explained by
5Figure 1: The game between government and citizens
extra beneﬁts which are available to the government when it acts outside of the constitu-
tion. We may think of kt−1 as a value which the government carries over from the previous
period, so we assume that kt−1 is common knowledge. For the decision to switch between
constitutional and unconstitutional state the government compares the diﬀerence in expected
revenue to the current realization of k.1
In our context, the constitution consists of a constitutional tax rate τc and the rule of
law. The decision to defect is taken at stage 0 when the government sets its actual tax rate.
It stays within the constitution (i.e. moves to c1
t) if it selects the tax rate τ = τc (we assume
that τc is binding for any given expectation, i.e. the government always wants to tax as
1We treat k as a threshold value instead of a periodic utility. Alternatively one may think of a periodic
beneﬁt which is consumed immediately after the defection.
6much as it can without changing the expectations of the citizens). The government violates
the constitution by selecting a tax rate τ in excess of τc.I nt h i sc a s ei tm o v e st onc1
t.T h e
decision to violate is governed by the preference kt−1.
In stage 1, before the government has a chance to reconsider its decision to violate the
constitution it realizes a preference shock. Its current value kt results from a stochastic
process with kt equally distributed over [kt−1 − κ,k t−1 + κ]. We assume that the preference
shock occurs immediately after selecting the tax rate. Citizen i observes a noise signal xi(kt)
which is equally distributed over [kt −ε,k t +ε]. Having updated their beliefs citizens decide
how much taxes they declare.
In stage two, after having observed aggregate tax evasion, θ, the government selects an
appropriate detection probability r and a ﬁne rate Θ which support the tax policy and
reconsiders its decision to violate the constitution.
If the government switches back to the constitution it has to give up revenue from ﬁnes
and tax revenues as far as they result from taxing in excess of the constitutionally admissible
tax rate. This means that the government which switches back always sets the detection
eﬀort equal to zero in order to save detection costs. The reverse is not necessarily true, i.e.
a government which stubbornly continues outside the constitution might still decide that it
is not worthwhile to pursue tax evaders. Once the government has switched back it is in
the constitutional node c0
t+1. For our two period exposition we assume that the government
is committed to stick to the constitutional tax rate for one more period. For the inﬁnite
horizon extension of the model note that the next decision would be on a tax rate for t +1
with a preference value kt. Clearly, given that the government was prepared to switch back
7with kt it also decides to stay in the constitution in the next round.
For the government which in stage 1 is in the constitutional state we assume that now is
not the time to decide on its constitutional status. From a technical angle this makes sense
because we had assumed that decisions on the tax rate are taken at stage 0, so there is the
only place to violate the constitution. Materially, however, this assumption clearly matters:
We eﬀectively rule out that the government can wait until the citizens have conﬁdently
declared their taxes in order to subsequently renege on the tax rate. Such a tax would raise
the same problem in our model as does a capital levy in models of capital taxation. With a
limited time horizon the argument for the sustainability of the constitution would unravel,
i.e. ex post the government always wants to impose a tax rate of 1.W i t ha ni n ﬁnite planning
horizon a tax rate below 1 can be shown to be sustainable if trust matters (see Chari and
Kehoe, 1990). However, incorporating such an argument into our model would certainly
overstretch the framework.
We proceed as follows: We consider the decision to switch back ﬁrst. Imperfect observ-
ability of k on the side of the citizens gives rise to a global game. This fact enables us to
derive a unique equilibrium value k∗
t such that the public forces the government to switch
back if kt <k ∗
t. In a next step we show that for vanishing ε t h eg a m ew i t hp r i o rkt−1 has
the same equilibrium value as the game without prior. Finally we derive a critical value for
kt−1 such that the government does not abandon the constitution if kt−1 <k ∗∗
t−1.W e c a n
show that the switch back mechanism economically matters, i.e. that it increases the critical
value: If the government realizes that it might be forced to switch back when it moves to
the unconstitutional state nc1
t, it is always more reluctant to do so, than if it could commit
8to stay outside of the constitution forever.
Note, that the process of information revelation is crucial for the model. If the government
would already know the precise value of its true character in nc2
t, the citizens could infer
the true character of the government from the tax rate selected. As is well known from
the analysis of global games, making k common knowledge destroys the uniqueness result
on k∗, but does not destroy the self-fulﬁlling property of beliefs. Furthermore, because in
c0
t the value of kt−1 is common knowledge, the government has no superior knowledge of
its character, so we can ignore any aspects arising from active signalling behavior of the
government.
For the tax rate determination stage nc1
t, we assume that the government aims to maxi-
m i z et h ee x p e c t e dr e v e n u ei nt h eu n c o n s t i t u t i o n a ls t a t e .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h e r ei ss o m em y -
opia on the side of the government. Alternative assumptions would be that the government
maximizes the probability of staying in the unconstitutional state or that the government
maximizes its expected revenue over both states. As will become obvious, all formulations
r e s u l ti nt h es a m et a xp o l i c yi ft h ec o n s t i t u t i o n a lt a xr a t ei s0. However, for the sake of
simplicity we stick with the ﬁrst goal and note, that this does not aﬀect the basic results of
our paper.
III. The Basic Model of Tax Evasion
In this section we set out the basic model of tax evasion which is a variant of Kolm (1973).
We normalize gross income and population size to one, denominate yi the income declared
for tax purposes by citizen i, r the probability of detection and τ the tax rate. A ﬁne is
9levied at a linear rate Θ o nn o nd e c l a r e di n c o m e(1 −yi).I ts a t i s ﬁes the (period by period)
non-bankruptcy condition Θ(1 − yi)+τyi ≤ 1.2
A. The Citizen’s Problem
A citizen i has to decide on declaring or evading taxes before she knows precisely what
kind of government she faces. Her expected (period by period) utility is linear in disposable
income:
EU











Pi is her subjective probability that the government does not enforce the policy (τ,Θ,r)
and varies across citizens. Below, we are going to show how Pi depends on the observation
of a signal of kt. In the constitutional state, τ ≡ τc and the announced policy is actually
carried out, so we have (1 − Pi) ≡ 1. In the unconstitutional state, the announced tax rate
τ diﬀers from the constitutionally admissible tax rate τc and the government may wish to
switch back to the constitution. Here, the citizen’s expected tax rate on declared income yi
is (1−Pi)τ +Piτc. (1−Pi)rEΘ is the expected charge on non declared income (1−yi). rE is
the detection probability which the citizen expects to face in the case where the government
enforces its policy. The decision of the government on r depends entirely on the amount
of tax evaders which it faces ex post. Here we assume that the citizen correctly anticipates
the amount of tax evaders when he makes his own decision to evade.3 As we are going
see, the value of Θ is always 1. ηi is the citizen’s preference for paying taxes. We assume
2As all citizens - including the marginal citizen who does so by assumption - realise a corner solution, the
restraint is, eﬀectively, Θ ≤ 1.
3In part 1 of the appendix we show that this assumption is justiﬁed if the noise in the signal xi vanishes.
10that ηi ≥ 0 for all i.T h ee m p i r i c a ll i t e r a t u r e( s e ee . g .S l e m r o d ,1 9 9 2 )r e p o r t st h a tp e o p l e
often declare taxes when it seems irrational in monetary terms to do so. Alternatively,
ηi can be interpreted as an individual risk premium for the risky option tax evasion. Let
G(i)=
R
(l|ηk ≥ ηi)dl be the share of citizens who are more risk averse than i. Utility is
linear in yi so the citizen’s tax evasion decision takes him to a corner solution and we have
the following
Lemma 1 Unless a citizen is indiﬀerent to the tax evasion problem either she declares her
whole income or nothing at all. Breaking indiﬀerence by assuming that she evades, a citizen
evades taxes if
Φ





Proof. Follows from (1) by linearity of Ui in yi.
For given τc and τ the share of citizens evading taxes θ ∈ [0,1] depends on the expected
detection probability rE,t h eﬁne Θ and their belief, Pi. (2) is equivalent to stating that the
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is positive. As Pi increases, the cost of paying taxes increases proportionately to τc,t h et a x
rate applying after the switch back. As Pi decreases, the cost of paying taxes increases by
τ − rEΘ, the price diﬀerential which applies if the policy is enforced. For P =1 ,e v e r y b o d y
evades taxes provided that assumption 1 holds for the most good willing (or risk averse)
citizen:
In this case he is only uncertain about whether the government is weak enough to give in.
11Assumption 1 η < τc.
This assumption seems well defensible: It claims that the constitutional tax is so high
so that nobody voluntarily pays it in the absence of detection eﬀorts. Note that, from our




The reason for this ambivalence is that the constitution not only promises to abandon
the ﬁne - which encourages tax evasion - but also to drop the unconstitutional share of taxes
- which encourages tax declaration. Once it is accepted that unconstitutional taxes should
be relieved under the constitution, tax evasion is sensitive to P only if the former eﬀect
outweighs the latter. As we are going to show, the government chooses its instruments such
that (4) holds almost surely if the preference shock gets small (see corollary 1 below).
B. The Government’s Problem
In this section we deal with the government’s problem of choosing its instruments (τ,r,Θ) ∈
[0,1]3. Formally we treat this choice problem as preceding the decision of whether or not to
switch back, although we know that if the government actually switches back it might want
to correct the detection probability chosen. From the timing of decisions outlined in ﬁgure
1 ,t h eg o v e r n m e n td e t e r m i n e sr and Θ in the last stage and the tax rate τ in the ﬁrst stage.
We solve the problem backwards, starting with the selection of a detection policy for a given
tax policy. In that stage of the game, the government knows its own character kt and the
actual share of tax evaders, θ.
12There is a detection technology which is represented by the cost function C(r,θ).W e
assume that C is convex with C(0,0) = 0, Cr > 0, Crr > 0, Cθ > 0, Cθθ > 0, Crθ > 0.T h e
last assumption is necessary for the game to exhibit supermodularity: as more citizens evade
taxes, the government’s cost increases, making a switch back more likely.4 Furthermore, we
demand that C(.,1) > 1, i.e. if everybody evades taxes, detection becomes prohibitively
costly.5
Formally, the problem in the last stage is to maximize revenue from taxing evaders at
rate Θr net of detection costs. Tax payers are taxed at the predetermined rate b τ:
V = θΘr +( 1− θ)b τ − C(r,θ) s.t. θ = b θ
For a given government income from ﬁn e si ti sa l w a y sb e t t e rt oi n c r e a s eΘ and reduce the
(costly) detection eﬀort so it is immediate that, in an optimum, the no bankruptcy condition
for the citizen is binding, i.e. Θ ≡ 1. This is in line with Kolm’s (1973) polemic principle,
which says that in an optimum tax evaders should be hung with a probability approaching
zero.
Because C(.,1) > 1 and Cθθ > 0 there is uniquely one level of tax evasion θ,w h e r et h e
government gives up detection eﬀorts. The ex post optimal detection policy given the share
of evaders is
4Assumption 2 below establishes a suﬃcient condition.
5The assumption that the government cannot detect any tax evaders when confronted with complete
disobeyence is clearly restrictive, especially, when the government does not act under the constitution and is,
therefore, free to adopt discriminatory measures. For our results it would be suﬃcient that it is prohibitively
costly to extend detection beyond some critical value which is ”not too far” above the detection level under
the constitution.
13Cr(r




∗,θ),1] for θ ≤ θ (5)
r =0 else
Note, that r is lower if it is chosen subsequently rather than simultaneously with τ.T h e
reason for this is that, when selected ex post, r does no longer contribute to deterring tax
evaders.
The problem of selecting the tax rate is more complex, at least in the case where the
government is in the unconstitutional state. In the constitutional state where the government
has selected a tax rate of τ = τc,w eh a v eP =0for all citizens. That is, the government
always enforces its policy. Now suppose that the government picks τ > τc and enters the
unconstitutional state. When selecting the tax rate the government does not know its future
determination kt to see it through, nor does it know the realization of tax evasion, θ.A saﬁrst
step however, assume that a certain realization of kt has taken place. Now citizens make their
decision on evasion knowing τ and a private signal of the true character of the government,
xi(kt). Having received the signal, each citizen holds a certain belief Pi that the government
is going to switch back. A citizen of type ηi evades taxes if Φi(Pi,τ − rE,τc,ηi) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the mass of tax evaders if






where e P is the distribution of beliefs Pi of the citizens. We assume that Pi and ηi are
stochastically independent. From (2) it is immediate that ∂θ
∂(τ−r) > 0 and ∂θ
∂e P > 0.W e
interpret ∂θ
∂e P as the reaction to a decrease of trust. Formally, ∂ e P is a change from e P0 to e P1
14where the cumulative distribution of e P0 stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution
of e P1.6
The relationship between τ and r is rather subtle in this model. Selecting a tax rate such
that θ =0would obviously result in a situation where r =0 , so the tax rate could be at
most τ = η. Although this would be sustainable as a taxation-detection equilibrium, it can
never be optimal to implement this policy because a slight increase would tax everybody
and only induce a vanishing crowding out eﬀect.
With heterogeneity and a given kt there is a unique pair (θ,r) for any tax rate selection
τ such that given e P only individuals with Φi < 0 declare taxes.7 The taxation-detection
equilibrium is determined by (5) and the inverse function of the ex ante correspondence (6):
r = θ
−1(b τ, e P,τ
c)
where we have used the fact that citizens correctly anticipate the share of evaders and,











for θ ≤ θ (7)
Noting that θ
−1
τ > 0 for θ < 1 we ﬁnd that 0 < dr
dτ < 1 for all eﬃcient levels of taxation.
For θ > θ,w eh a v edr
dτ =0 . W h e nt h eg o v e r n m e n tg i v e su pd e t e c t i o ne ﬀorts at θ = θ it
6Let H(Pk)=
R
(i|Pi ≤ Pk)di. Stochastic dominance implies that H(Pk|e P0) ≥ H(Pk|e P1) for all Pk or,
equivalently, that e P1 results from a ﬂattening of e P0.
7In the absence of heterogeneity we would have to postulate that the private sector plays a mixed strategy
i nt h ec a s eo fc e r t a i n t yw h e r ePi is 0 for for everybody: for any tax rate, the private sector plays tax evasion
with a probabilty θ such that r(θ(τ − r∗)) = r∗. This equilibrium is, however, not very convincing in that
the private sector is indiﬀerent toward switching to any other mixed strategy θ
0.
8see part 2 of the appendix.
15switches from a high detection probability to a zero detection probability which drives the
share of tax evaders up to 1 with revenues falling from (1 − θ)τ.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government does not know its character kt. However, the distribu-
tion of beliefs, e P, depends on the realization of kt. Therefore, the government has to treat
e P(kt) as a stochastic variable. We had assumed that the government sets the tax rate to
maximize its revenue in the unconstitutional state, i.e. if it does not switch back.9 Therefore,
for its tax selection problem, the government takes expectations over all possible realizations
of kt ≥ k∗
t, uses θ = θ(τ,Er, e P(kt),τc) and solves:
Max
τ EV = E[θr(τ,θ)+( 1− θ)τ − C(r(τ,θ),θ)] (8)
s.t. τ ≤ 1. (9)
Deﬁne the Lagrangian L = EV + λ(1 − τ −s), for some s ≥ 0.T h eF O C ’ sa r e
∂L
∂τ








)+( θ − Cr)
dr
dτ
] − λ =0 (10)
∂L
∂λ
=1− τ − s =0and s =0 ,λ > 0 or s>0 and λ =0 . (11)
(11) are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions which say that either (a) λ =0and τ < 1 or (b)
τ =1and λ > 0.F o r kt ≥ k∗
t we either have θ(kt) − Cr(θ(kt)) = 0 or dr =0 ,s ot a k i n g






dτ)] > 0 in (10)
we observe that the ﬁrst term is positive and the second factor in the second term is positive
so that for λ =0the expression on the left-hand side assumes zero only if τ −Er+Cθ > 0.
9This assumption basically spares us discussing another non continuity when solving the government’s
problem.
16Note that for calculating Er we take expectations over all possible realizations rE(θ(kt)).
Because the government never chooses τ such that the expected value of tax evaders is
Eθ =1 , we know that10
τ − Er < η. (12)
Together with assumption 1 this yields τ − Er < τc. In view of condition (4) which has
to be fulﬁlled for citizens to respond positively to a change in P we ﬁnd:
Corollary 1 The government sets τ such that it fulﬁlls τ −Er < τc ex ante. For κ → 0 the
government picks τ such that τ − rE < τc is almost always true ex post.
This means that at least in the case where the preference shock vanishes citizens are







+( Er− ECθ) − λ (13)
If the restraint τ ≤ 1 is not binding (λ =0 ) and increasing taxes increases expected
receipts by (1 − Eθ) but also reduces government income due to an increase in tax evaders.
A higher expected detection rate reduces tax evasion and allows to levy a higher tax rate.
Finally, adverse eﬀects of higher taxes run via increasing tax evasion and thereby detection
10Note that ex post it must always be true that τ −rE(θ(kt)) < η for all kt. Suppose that not. Then there
is one b k such that θ =1for kt < b k.N o wl e tkt−1 assume a high enough value such that the government knows
that the private sector is going to end up holding beliefs of Pi =0for all i.I nt h a tc a s e ,τ − rE(θ(kt)) < η
because otherwise θ =1for all realisations of kt.N o wf o ra l ls m a l l e rp r i o r skt−1 the belief of the public in
the switch back is increased, i.e. de P>0. But because ∂θ
∂e P > 0 the condition τ −rE(θ(kt)) < η must also be
fulﬁlled for these priors. Finally, integrating over all possible k’s yields (12).
17costs. Observe, that for θ =0we would have r → 0 (from (5)) and, therefore, dr/dτ → 1
(from (7)), so τ would be 1, defeating any equilibrium of that kind.
IV. Multiple Equilibria under Common Knowledge
Now assume that we are in the unconstitutional state and the parameter kt can be perfectly
observed by the citizens. We construct a Nash equilibrium in the following way: Given the
strategies of the other citizens and the government, no citizen wishes to change his own
strategies. Furthermore, given the strategies of the citizen, the government wishes to carry
out its policy. It is immediate from the deﬁnition of an equilibrium that all citizens follow the
same strategy (i.e. evade or not evade). We are showing that if τc is suﬃciently small, there
is a range kt ∈ (kL,kH) where either all citizens evade taxes and the government switches
back or all citizens pay taxes and the government stays in the unconstitutional state.
Consider the best government policy if P =1for all citizens. From (2) and because
η < τc from assumption 1 we have θ =1(5). Because C(.,1) > 1 the government does not
undertake any detection eﬀort. Resulting revenue V (1) = 0.
Now consider the case P =0for all citizens. Solving the government’s problem backwards
yields Cr(r,θ)=θ. As we have seen, having no tax evaders cannot be an equilibrium, so
θ > 0. Because τ = r(θ)+η would result in a mass of tax evaders of zero, it must be that
the government sets
τ
0 >r (θ)+η. (14)
Because enforcement is actually carried out (i.e. θ ≤ θ) resulting revenues are V (0) =
18(1−θ)τ0 +θr(θ
0)−C(r(θ),θ) > 0 so V (0) >V(1) is true. Furthermore τ0 > τc because we
had assumed that τc is actually binding.
Now consider the decision of the government to switch back. The pay oﬀs in the case
where the government switches back is T
nc,c
t (P)=τcθ in the current period because the
government sacriﬁces the unconstitutional part of the tax and does not undertake detection
eﬀorts. In the second period, income is V c. If the government stays outside of the con-
stitution, it has the unconstitutional income which is either V (P =1 )or V (P =0 ) .T h e





t (P) − V
nc
t (P) − V
nc
t+1(P) − kt > 0. (15)





nc,c(P =0 )− 2V
nc(P =0 ) (16)
Furthermore, there is kH such that the government does not even switch back if P =1as




nc,c(P =1 )− 2V
nc(P =1 ) (17)
From (17) and (16), there are parameter ranges where the government’s strategy does
not depend on the expectations of the citizens. Finally we have to show that kL <k H:
Lemma 2 There is τc < τc,H such that under certainty the government does not switch back
if P =1and kt ≥ kH where kH >k L .
19Proof. Using (16) and (17), kH >k L is Tnc,c(P =0 ) −Tnc,c(P =1 )< 2(V nc(P =0 )− V nc(P =1 ) ) .
Using Tnc,c(P =1 )=0 , Tnc(P =0 )=τc this implies that 1
2τc,H = V nc(P =0 )− V nc(P =
1).
It might be surprising that lemma (2) places a maximum condition on the constitutional
tax rate. Note, however that we are not interested in, say the maximum value of kt which
is still compatible with a switch back if P =1 , but only in the eﬀect of tax evasion on the
values of kt which might be compatible with a switch back if P switches from 0 to 1.I ft h e
constitutional tax rate is rather high (i.e. only weakly binding), the government is rather
easily convinced to switch back both for P =1and P =0 . However, tax evasion might even
be counterproductive in the sense that the government is more easily persuaded to switch
back where it can keep most of its income (i.e. where (1 − θ)i sh i g ha n dt a x e da tτc).
In the case where kt ∈ (kL ,kH) beliefs of the citizens are self-fulﬁlling and we have
multiple equilibria:
Proposition 1 In the case of certainty, if τc < τc,H and kt ∈ (kL ,k H), there are two
equilibria: one, where no-one declares income for tax purposes and one, where everybody
declares income for tax purposes.
Proof. L e m m a2a n dt h ed e ﬁnitions of (17) and (16) imply that the government does not
switch back if P =0and k ≥ kL and it switches back if P =1and k<k H. Now citizens’
strategies are θ =1if P =1and θ =0if P =0 .
20V. The switch back condition under Incomplete Information
Because multiplicity of equilibria is unsatisfying we are going to introduce uncertainty of the
private agents over the fundamental kt when they decide on tax evasion. This enables us to
apply the results of the literature on global games to our game. In order to have a global
game we need a pair k, k where there is a dominant strategy if citizens know that either
k<kor k>k and strategies of the citizens have to be strategic complements, i.e. if more
citizens evade taxes there are incentives for everybody else to evade taxes.
There are two problem which prevent us from directly using the results established so far
to conclude that we have a global game.
First, proposition 1 cannot be directly translated: The government now sets its tax rate
under uncertainty. Therefore, the tax rate is ex post wrong in the case where citizens agree
that kt is in the dominance range with P =0 . Therefore, V nc(b τ) <V nc(τ(P =0 ) )and
the government has to be relatively more stubborn to stay in the unconstitutional state, so
k >k L. In the case where kt is in the dominance range where everybody believes in a switch
back, the tax rate does not matter because θ =1 . Therefore, k = kH. It is straightforward
to see that the strategies which citizens play under certainty are dominant for k<kand for
k>k = kH.
Secondly, although we know that a suﬃcient share of tax evaders forces the government
into a switch back, strategies might not be strategic complements throughout the range of
unstable ks.
If the criterion ∆ increases in θ, both problems are solved given that agents behave
regularly (i.e. (4) is also fulﬁlled). Rewriting (15) using Tnc,c(P)=τc(1 − θ(P, b τ,r)) and




> 0 for all θ (18)
to be true is that the following assumption holds:
Assumption 2 C(r,θ) is suﬃciently steep to satisfy
2(b τ − r + Cθ) > τ
c for all θ(b τ,r, e P,τ
c) (19)
This condition is somewhat awkward because it is not a condition on the primitives of the





holds. For Crr →∞we have dr
dτ → 1 so that τ −Er+ECθ+λ is arbitrarily large. Therefore,
t h e r ei sa l w a y sac o s tf u n c t i o nC which satisﬁes (19).
A s s u m p t i o n2i sa l s of u l ﬁlled if τc is suﬃciently low. This condition is reminiscent of the
fact that a lower τc makes the switch back income less dependent on tax evasion. Tax evasion
may actually frustrate the government from switching back, because a higher evasion means
a loss in switch back income. This argument is the same as the one discussed in connection
with lemma 2.
Corollary 2 G i v e nt h a ta s s u m p t i o n2i sf u l ﬁlled, we have k>kand tax avoidance strategies
are strategic complements.
Proof. The ﬁr s tp a r ti si m m e d i a t ef r o mt h ed e ﬁnitions (16) and (17) and from (15) in
connection with (18). As, from (18) it is clear that the switch back becomes more likely with
more evaders, strategic complementarity follows trivially with (4).
22VI. The Game with Imperfect Information of k
In this part of the paper we derive a unique equilibrium for the game between the govern-
ment and the citizens, using the results on global games by Carlsson/van Damme (1983),
Morris/Shin (1998, 1999, 2000) and Frankel/Morris and Pauzner (2002). These papers show
that multiplicity of equilibria is removed if the assumption of common knowledge is aban-
doned and replaced by the assumption, that agents observe - and know that the other agents
observe - a fuzzy signal of the true state of the system. Our model incorporates imperfect
observability of kt on the side of the citizens. Corollary 2 shows that there are dominance
areas - i.e. citizens have a dominating strategy if they know for sure that kt <kand kt > k.
As the corollary also shows that tax avoidance strategies are complements in the unstable
region of kt, this can be used to iteratively eliminate dominated strategies moving from k
upwards and from k downwards.
From (18) and because ∂∆
∂kt < 0 there exists a strictly increasing function φ(kt) for kt ∈
(k,k) where upon increasing kt, ∆ switches from a positive to a negative value for a given
share of evaders θ.L e tφ(kt) be the critical mass of evaders θ. From the deﬁnition of k and
k we know that φ(k) ≥ θ and φ(k) ≤ θ.
We assume that the signal xi of kt which citizen i receives is equally distributed over
(kt − ε,k t + ε). Because our argument builds upon the iterative elimination of dominated
strategies as laid out in the appendix we know that strategies for agent i take the form:
evade taxes if xi ≤ ξ
i for some cut oﬀ point ξ
i. This is, citizens evade taxes if they observe
a government which is weaker than some threshold.11 For the moment, assume that the
11That strategies take this form emerges endogeneously in this model when we iterate from the boundaries.
23distribution of cut oﬀ points is exogenously given. They are distributed according to e ξ with









W(e ξ|kt) is the share of citizens who have received a signal falling short of their individual
cut oﬀ point ξ given that ξ is distributed according to f. The term on the r.h.s. gives the
probability that ξ is higher than the signal in the interval [θ−ε,θ+ε].N o w ,i ft h et r u es t a t e
is kt, then the government defects if W(e ξ|kt) ≥ φ(kt) with probability one. The maximum
kt f o rw h i c ht h eg o v e r n m e n ts w i t c h e sb a c ki su n i q u e l y 12 given by
b kt = Max{kt|W(e ξ|kt) ≥ φ(θ)}. (21)
Now, the probability which an agent who receives the message xi assigns to the event












2ε is the density of the distribution of kt and e ξ
−i
is the distribution of ξ without the
agent (which coincides with e ξ because the agent is atomic). ψ is attained by integrating over
all kt which are in accordance with a defection of the government and sets them in relation
to all kt which are possible from the observation (which has the measure 1). Let ξ
i be the













12See part 3 of the appendix
24where Pi∗ is the critical value in (3). A immediate consequence of (23) is that ξ
i ∼ i (or
ξ
i ∼ 1/ηi).
In the appendix we show that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 In the case of uncertainty over kt there is a unique equilibrium point k∗
t
supported by a distribution of e ξ such that k <k ∗




VII. The Decision to Defect from the Constitution
Up to this point we have considered the case of a government which has already defected from
the constitution. We have shown that depending on the realization of kt,t h eg o v e r n m e n ti s
forced to switch back by the reaction of the citizens. What we want to show now is that the
switch back mechanism is capable of deterring the government from defecting at the outset.
F o rt h i sw em o d e lt h es t a g ei nc0
t in ﬁgure 1 when the government is in the constitutional
state. The preference of the government at this stage is kt−1 w h i c hi sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e .
This is important, because in this case the decision of the government on whether to defect
or not does not reveal anything to the citizen and is not subject to strategic considerations.
Recall that kt is equally distributed over (kt−1 − κ,k t−1 + κ) and let the form of this
process be common knowledge. Furthermore assume that the error term in the signal is
vanishing and that any prior which is capable of generating the original equilibrium point
k∗
t is contained in (k,k). For that case we show in the appendix:
25Lemma 3 Consider the game with a prior of kt, kt−1.L e tε → 0 and (k∗
t −κ,k ∗
t +κ) ⊂ (k,k).
Then the equilibrium point in the game with a prior, k∗0
t and the equilibrium point in the game
without a prior, k∗
t,c o i n c i d e .
The government has to decide on whether it defects from the constitution, in which case
it is in the unconstitutional stage in period t, or whether it stays with the constitution, in
which case it receives an income of V c in period t. Our only restriction on the timing is that
the government can choose the constitution only by announcing a constitutional tax rate -
in which case it is restricted to carry out taxation accordingly. For the decision in period
t − 1 this means that it may as well defect one period later. Let w be the density function












nc( e P(kt))dkt + kt−1. (24)
The left hand side of this inequality is the expected pay oﬀ for the government in t if
it chooses the unconstitutional state. The right hand side gives the expected utility from
violating the constitution. In the case where kt <k ∗0
t , the government switches back and
receives Tnc,c. In the other case, it stays in the unconstitutional state. w is the conditional
distribution of kt after the observation of kt−1. For any kt the state of the government induces
a probability distribution on the side of the citizens, e P(kt). Because citizens only receive a
signal x ∼ (kt − ε,k t + ε),s o m ec i t i z e n s( b u ta tm o s tφ(k∗0
t )) do (erroneously) evade taxes
even if kt ≥ k∗0
t
Lemma 4 There is a unique switching point k∗∗
t−1 such that the government does not violate
the constitution if kt−1 <k ∗∗
t−1







2κ decreases from 1 to 0 as kt−1 goes from k∗ −κ to
k∗ + κ. The r.h.s. of (24) increases monotonically as kt−1 increases.
Now it is straightforward to show that the switch back mechanism economically matters.
Observe, that without the switch back mechanism, the condition for the government to defect
from the constitution would read
V
c ≥ V
nc(P =0 )+kt−1. (25)
Let k0
t−1 be the value for which (25) is binding. In order to evaluate (24), note that
V nc( e P(kt)) ≤ V nc(P =0 )for kt ≥ k∗0
t . Now it is immediate that (25) is less binding than
(24) and that k∗∗
t−1 >k 0
t−1 and we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For k∗
t ≥ k0
t−1 − κ the switch back mechanism is substantial: The critical




Proof. For any kt−1 ∈ (k∗
t − κ,k∗
t + κ) there is some probability that a switch back takes
place which tends to make the r.h.s. of (24) smaller than (25), so the critical value for kt−1
increases. For kt−1 greater than k∗
t + κ the probability of a switch back would be 1.
It is easy to see that k0
t−1 ∈ (k,k). Our model is too general, however, to relate k∗ in
an unambigous way to k0 − κ. That, in turn, would be necessary to relate k0 to k∗∗.T h e r e
might be cases where the punishment after the defection is suﬃciently weak so nothing
follows from the rule of law. But as we have shown in Neumaerker/Pech, 2001 for a case in
which expectations are Laplace some k∗ > 0 can be supported whereas k0 is always smaller
27than zero. It is also worth noting that there is always an eﬀect on outcomes if κ is suﬃciently
large.13
VIII. Extension to the infinite horizon case
We can now extend our results to an inﬁn i t eh o r i z o ng a m e .A l lw eh a v et od oi st oe n d o g e n i z e
the decisions in the nodes at t+1and note that the problem is stationary. In order to proceed
we have to agree, however, that the government always looses the illegal ﬁnes and revenue
of the last year whenever it decides to switch back. A stricter condition would make it
increasingly diﬃcult for a government ever to switch back after a couple of periods have
elapsed outside of the constitution. Consider ﬁgure 1 again. As the government moves to
stage 0 in t+1the prior kt becomes common knowledge. Suppose government has to decide
over a tax rate in c0
t+1. First assume that k∗ ≤ k∗∗ in which case a government which has
switched back wants to stay with the constitution in t+1.T h i si st h ec o n ﬁguration shown in
the upper part of ﬁgure 2. If k∗ >k 0 − κ, k∗∗ undoubtedly exceeds k0, so the intertemporal
constraint is operative. Now let k∗ increase. This gives rise to the case where k∗ >k ∗∗ as
shown in the lower part of ﬁgure 2. For k∗ to be greater than k∗∗ it is necessary, however,
that k∗∗ >k 0. This is because by proposition 3, k∗∗ = k0 only if k∗ ≤ k0 − κ.N o w t h e r e
are cases where the government switches back only to return to the unconstitutional state
again. Obviously this cannot be an equilibrium at the stage where the switch back decision
is taken. For k∗ >k ∗∗, the switch is not credible which means that k∗∗ eﬀectively constrains
k∗ in the inﬁnite horizon case.
Therefore, we can restrict attention to cases where k∗ ≤ k∗∗. Here, any situation in
13This is, provided that the condition in corollary 1 is also fulﬁlled ex post.
28Figure 2: Ex ante and ex post switching points in the inﬁnite horizon case
c0
t+1 with kt−1 <k ∗∗ is stable. Suppose the government is already in nc0
t+1, i.e. it has not
switched back. Here, kt is greater than the critical value k∗ and the government picks the
unconstitutional tax again. It is striking that there are situations with kt ∈ (k∗,k ∗∗) where
t h eg o v e r n m e n th a sn o ts w i t c h e db a c ka l t h o u g hi tw o u l dw a n tt os t a yi nt h ec o n s t i t u t i o n a l
branch had it not violated before. This might even include cases (k∗ <k 0)w h e r et h e
government would actually stay with the constitution under the orthodox rule (these cases,
however, vanish if κ gets small).
Legality seems to impose a cost at least in the latter case and it seems to unduly prevent
the government from returning to the legal order in the other case. On second thought,
however, this inﬂexibility of legality is a blessing. The critical element why the rule of law
protects the constitution in the inﬁnite horizon case is that the government can never expect
to change from the unconstitutional to the constitutional branch of the game tree without
as a c r i ﬁce.14 If it could slip back into the constitutional state just by lowering the tax rate
14The point is that a ﬂawed law cannot be corrected without consequence, but it has to be annulled.
This in turn has the consequence that once the government has moved to nc0
t+1 it can only return to the
constitutional state by granting an amnestie for tax evaders.
29while going on to collect last year’s ﬁnes, the legality mechanism would be defeated. It is,
in the end, the cost imposed by its inability to renegotiate easily on its constitutional status
which deters the government from defecting from the constitution in the ﬁrst place.
IX. Appendix
A. Appendix 1
In this part of the appendix we show that the citizens correctly forecast the share of tax
evaders if the noise in the observation vanishes. From (20) we know that the share of agents












is the expected share of tax evaders if the observation is x. Taking the limit for vanishing ε
gives lim
ε→0 Ω(e ξ|x)=W(e ξ|k).
B. Appendix 2
In this appendix we do comparative statics involving the government’s instruments. By (5)







The correspondence r = C−1
r (θ) has r(θ =0 )=0and is increasing in θ and the corre-
spondence r = θ
−1(τ, e P,τc) is decreasing in θ.C o n s i d e rτ =0and θ
−1(0, e P,τc).F o rP ≡ 0
all i we have θ
−1 ≤ η and r(θ)=0 .B u t b e c a u s e θ
−1 shifts upwards with an increase in
30τ,t h e r ei ss o m eτ such that θ
−1(τ,0,τc)=0=r(θ). Therefore, in the absence of further
restrictions, for tax rates τ > τ. As pointed out in the text, taxes are never lower because
this would be ineﬃcient.
Levels of taxation which are too high may yield θ > θ so r is not enforced. Therefore we
claim in the text that the derivative exists for all eﬃcient levels of taxation.
In order to derive (7) in the text we totally diﬀerentiate the system with respect to r:
C
−1












r and rearranging we get (7).
In order to get dτ
de P we totally diﬀerentiate with respect to e P:
C
−1








where θe P > 0 and θ
−1
e P > 0 and C
−1
rθ > 0.U s i n gC
−1
rθ θe P = C−1
rr θ
−1















Uniqueness of b k in (21) can be established as follows: W decreases monotonically in kt for
any given e ξ and φ strictly increases in kt.I f ξ(i) ∈ [k − ε,k + ε] (which we establish in
the next section) then W(e ξ|k) ≥ φ(k) and W(e ξ|k) ≤ φ(k) and there exists a unique point
b kt ∈ [k,k] which satisﬁes
b kt = W
−1(φ( b kt)|e ξ). (26)
31D. Appendix 4
In this appendix we show that iterative elimination of dominated strategies yields an unique
equilibrium point k∗.B e f o r e w e d o t h i s d e ﬁne the cumulative distribution function F(ξ).






(1 − F(x))dx. (27)
Because (1 − F(x))g i v e sPr(ξ ≥ x|x) it is immediate, that in the case of homogenous
agents where all ξ coincide in equilibrium, the term in parentheses simply equals 1.A st h e
distribution G(i) is continuous, the distribution of critical values, P∗(i) is continuous as well
and F(ξ) inherits continuity from P∗(i).
First, rule out that a positive measure of agents do not attack when receiving a message
xi = k − ε.C o n s i d e ra g e n ti and assume that for all other agents, ξ
−i(b)
0 <k− ε where the
index (b) indicates that we iterate from below. Then, Γ(e ξ
−i
|k)=0for k ≤ k and φ(k)=0
for k ≤ k. Therefore, the probability of a successful attack is Pi =1and all agents attack
when they receive the message xi = k − ε.L e tξ
i(b)


















t ).A sw eh a v es e e n ,k
(b)
0 = k.















t . This in turn determines ξ
(b)
t+2.






2εdk = Pi∗ for all i.15 It is immediate that the relationship in
15Pech (2002) shows that this equilibrium point is, indeed, unique.
32each sequence is strict for k
(b)








t for all i with (a) indicating that we
iterate from above. This sequence starts with ξ
−i(a)
















In this appendix, we show how a prior kt−1 aﬀects the equilibrium value k∗0 at the next stage.
(a) If x0 ∈ (kt−1 − κ + ε,k t−1 + κ − ε) we have w(k|x0,k t−1)=w(k|x0)= 1
2ε for k ∈
(x0−ε,x 0+ε).I nt h i sc a s e ,s e tX =[ x0−ε,x 0+ε] of kt which is possible from the observation
x0 is covered by the set K =[ kt−1 − κ,k t−1 + κ] of kt which is possible from the prior kt−1,
so the prior does not aﬀect the probability distribution over k.
(b) If xi ∈ (kt−1 − κ,k t−1 − κ + ε) we have w(k|xi,k t−1)= 1
2ε−D for k ∈ (x − (ε −
D/2),x+(ε−D/2). In this case it is clear that kt is in the intersection X ∩K.T h el e n g t h
of the interval for the posterior distribution of kt is shortened by the absolute diﬀerence
D = |X| − |X ∩ K| where D = |kt−1 − xi + ε − κ|. The updated expected value for kt is
x =
kt−1−κ+xi+ε











Consider the case with homogeneous agents, i.e. where ξ
i = ξ
−i. Using the identity









D + κ − ε
2ε − D
.
33Solving for the critical observation xi = ξ,
ψ








∂ξ < 0, this expression is not monotonic in ξ. However, the range where
case b) applies, i.e. where xi ∈ (kt−1 − κ,k t−1 − κ + ε) vanishes if ε → 0.16
c) The case xi ∈ (kt−1 + κ − ε,k t−1 − κ + ε) is treated in a similar way.
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